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With the advent of the Internet, we have seen existing markets transform and new ones 
emerge. We contribute to the understanding of this phenomenon by developing a unified 
theory about the role that IT plays in affecting market information, transparency and 
market structure. In particular, we introduce a new theoretical framework which uncovers 
the process and the forces that, together with IT, facilitate or inhibit the emerging 
dominance of transparent electronic markets. Transparent electronic markets offer 
unbiased, complete, and accurate market information. Our effort to develop a unified 
theoretical framework begins with a thorough assessment of the prior literature.  It also 
uses an inductive approach involving the case study method, in which we contrast and 
compare the forces that have led the air travel and financial securities markets to 
become increasingly transparent. Building on the electronic markets and electronic 
hierarchies research of Malone, Yates and Benjamin (1987), our findings suggest that IT 
alone does not explain a move to transparent electronic markets.  Instead, we argue that 
enhanced electronic representation of products, and competitive and institutional forces 
have also played an important role in the process by which most sellers have come to 
favor transparent markets.  
                                                
1 Sirkka Jarvenpaa was the accepting senior editor. This paper was submitted on March 16, 
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The electronic markets hypothesis (EMH) posits that IT reduces coordination costs 
between suppliers and buyers, leading to the dominance of market-based forms of 
economic activity (Malone et al., 1987). The primary drivers of this move are advanced 
ITs such as the Internet, which provide a platform that reduces information search costs.  
The EMH predicts that, in this technological environment, biased electronic markets will 
emerge as suppliers take advantage of IT to lock in buyers. However, unbiased 
electronic markets will gradually dominate, where all products and suppliers can be 
evaluated by buyers to make well-informed decisions.   
 
Unbiased markets generally benefit buyers because they are better able to discern the 
product that best fits their needs. However, this very benefit to buyers may be a threat to 
sellers, as they forego the benefits of information asymmetries. Consequently, some 
industries that were expected to move to unbiased electronic markets have not done so.  
Possible explanations include the move-to-the-middle hypothesis (Clemons et al., 1993) 
and the risk-augmented transaction cost theory (Kauffman and Mohtadi, 2004), which 
uncover the incentives of market participants to implement biases. Nevertheless, many 
firms deliberately compete for buyers with market information. 
 
So far, theories of the impact of IT on market structure explain rather specific outcomes. 
At one extreme, there are theories such as the EMH that predict a move to unbiased 
electronic markets. On the other hand, there are theories that explain why biased 
markets and other quasi-market forms may prevail. However, both outcomes are 
observed in the real world, and it appears that firms’ strategic choices of firms can affect 
these outcomes. For example, although many online travel agencies have embraced the 
Internet to offer products and prices from most airlines (Granados et al., 2005), a similar 
move that would be expected in the mortgage industry has not occurred—at least not to 
the same extent (Hess and Kemerer, 1994). With the advent of the Internet, the long-
term outcome of the mortgage industry’s structure is still uncertain, and it will depend on 
the technical implementation choices of firms in the industry (Wigand et al., 2005).  
 
Our objective is to examine the variations in market outcomes as firms use IT to 
compete for consumers with market information and to provide theoretical explanations 
for these variations. We start by integrating existing arguments from different theories 
about why specific market outcomes may prevail. In particular, we use Malone et al.’s 
(1987) and other authors’ numerous arguments about the conditions under which 
unbiased electronic markets are preferred over biased electronic markets.2 We also use 
arguments from theories that explain why biased markets may prevail.  In other words, 
while we use existing theory on hierarchies and markets as a theoretical foundation, we 
focus on the different dimensions of market transformation triggered by IT, once market-
based forms are in place.  
                                                
2 We are indebted to the anonymous reviewers and the senior editor for helping us to 
appropriately position our theoretical contribution in this research, so as to ensure that the reader 
will understand how it differs from the work of Malone et al. (1987). 
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In addition, we observe that firms have used IT to devise complex strategies to 
manipulate information that affect more than just the level of bias of their market 
mechanisms. A more complete characterization of the possible strategies is related to 
the concept of market transparency, which includes the accuracy and completeness of 
market information, in addition to the level of bias. Therefore, there is an opportunity to 
extend the theoretical foundations of the impact of IT on market structure, based on real-
world observations from recent years, as the Internet has fueled the evolution of 
electronic markets. 
 
In this article, we examine how IT interacts with other forces to facilitate or inhibit a move 
to transparent electronic markets, and set the stage for future research on other forms of 
advanced market organization. We use a case research strategy, which is appropriate to 
answer “how” questions (Benbasat et al., 1987) and uncover process knowledge. In 
particular, we build theory to answer the following research questions: 
 
• To what extent do we observe a move to transparent markets in different 
sectors? 
• What are the factors and theoretical bases that explain differences in market 
structure in the presence of IT? 
 
To answer these questions, we leverage the theory of market design (Spulber, 1999), 
which studies the design of market mechanisms that enable trade. This theory provides 
new perspectives on the possible outcomes of market organization, beyond just the level 
of bias. We categorize the market design choices that firms make in terms of 
informational features and the degree of automation, and use this expanded set of 
market design dimensions to analyze the IT-driven transformation in the air travel and 
financial securities markets. Then, consistent with case study methodologies for theory 
development (Eisenhardt, 1989), we perform a cross-case analysis to develop testable 
propositions regarding the impact of IT on market structure. Due to the information-
intensive nature of these industries, our analysis emphasizes impacts of IT on 
informational features of markets. However, further theoretical development to explore IT 
and market structure is appropriate in other dimensions.  
 
We next present two theories—the theory of electronic markets and electronic 
hierarchies, and the theory of market design, as bases for construction of a unified 
theoretical framework for market transparency.  In the third section, we analyze the 
market structure transformation of the United States financial securities markets and the 
air travel industry.  In the fourth section, we perform a cross-case analysis to derive a 
theoretical framework of the impact of IT on market transparency.  We conclude with a 
discussion and preliminary evaluation of our theoretical contribution and note some 




We define an electronic market as a system that allows market participants to exchange 
information about prices and product offerings electronically. In this article, IT refers to 
technological artifacts that enable electronic markets, such as Internet, network 
technologies, and communication technologies. We next describe two theories that 
provide building blocks to formulate an explanation of how IT shapes a market’s 
structure: electronic markets and hierarchies theory and market design theory. 
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Electronic Markets And Hierarchies 
 
Theories about the impact of IT on organizational forms are rooted in transaction cost 
economics. Coase (1937), in his discussion of the boundary of the firm, suggested that 
the flow of materials will occur within a firm to the extent that the respective transaction 
costs are lower than those in the price mechanisms of markets. More generally, firms (or 
hierarchies) and markets are two polar forms of economic activity, while contractual 
arrangements between firms fall along a continuum from firms to markets, such as 
electronic integration, long-term contracts, and joint ventures (Zaheer and Venkatraman, 
1994).  
 
Building on transaction cost economics, the electronic market hypothesis (EMH) of 
Malone et al. (1987) predicts that IT will lead to higher use of market transactions in the 
conduct of economic activity.  IT reduces market coordination costs, such as the cost of 
searching for suppliers, establishing contracts, and buying supplies in the spot market.  
The EMH also predicts that moves to market-based forms of organization will be 
gradual; they will not occur all at once.   
 
Malone et al. (1987) state that the first stage will involve movement from electronic 
hierarchies to biased electronic markets.  In this stage, suppliers benefit from 
implementing systems that conceal or distort information about competitors.  In the 
second stage, competitive and legal forces lead to the adoption of unbiased electronic 
markets, where all options for trading are made available. Finally, in the third stage, the 
proliferation of information in unbiased markets leads to personalized markets, with 
functionality that allows buyers to filter the options available for trading. In this manner, 
Malone et al. (1987) and other researchers identified the potential impact that IT can 
have on the informational structure of markets.  
 
It is fair to say that the overall predictions of Malone et al.’s (1987) work were remarkably 
on target in some industries.  One example that especially rings true is the air travel 
industry, which captures their predictions about unbiased and personalized markets. 
   
“In these cases, a final stage may be the development of electronic markets that 
provide personalized decision aids to help individual buyers select from the 
alternatives available, what we call personalized markets (bold added for 
emphasis). For example, at least one such system has been developed for airline 
reservations … Using this system, travel agencies and corporate travel 
departments can receive information about available flights with each flight 
automatically ranked on a scale from 1 to 100. The rankings take into account 
‘fares, departure times, and even the value of an executive’s time.’  … It is easy 
to imagine even more sophisticated systems that use artificial intelligence (AI) 
techniques to screen advertising messages and product descriptions according 
to precisely the criteria that are important to a given buyer …  Air travelers, for 
instance, might specify rules with which their own automated buyers’ agents 
(bold again added for emphasis) could compare a wide range of possible flights 
and select the ones that best match that particular traveler’s preferences. A fairly 
simple set of such rules could, in many cases, do a better job of matching 
travelers’ preferences than all but the most conscientious and knowledgeable 
travel agents. (pp. 492-493) 
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Despite this accurate prediction in one industry, real world observations point out that IT 
innovations have not necessarily led to market-based forms of organization in other 
industries.  Hess and Kemerer (1994) analyzed mortgage markets, for example, and 
suggested that the EMH may need to be reframed because it does not clearly explain 
the lack of electronic market organization in the industry. Since Hess and Kemerer 
study, the rise of the Internet has had to industry-wide efforts to implement vertical XML-
based IS standards to improve mortgage processing, data exchange and information 
transparency long the supply chain (Wigand et al., 2005).  Thus, one could argue that 
the industry is now more electronic market-like than when Hess and Kemerer examined 
it; however, on a relative basis the move to unbiased mortgage markets has not 
occurred to the extent that it has in air travel markets.  
 
Alternative theories have emerged to explain these industry structure outcomes, which 
we label quasi-market theories.  These theories suggest that IT also reduces 
coordination costs of rather hierarchical contractual arrangements so that relationships 
with a few suppliers may prevail. Clemons et al. (1993) proposed a move-to-the-middle 
hypothesis; recognizing that IT may not only impact the transaction costs of market 
coordination, but also the transaction costs of long-term business relationships, such as 
monitoring product quality or safe-guarding relationship-specific investments. By 
reducing product complexity and asset specificity, IT reduces the transaction costs of 
long-term relationships, so buyers may prefer explicit coordination with a few suppliers 
over the purchase of supplies in the spot market.3  Wang and Seidman (1995) suggest 
that, due to negative externalities, it may be optimal for fewer suppliers to join an 
electronic data interchange system. More recently, Kauffman and Mohtadi (2004) 
proposed a risk-augmented transaction cost theory that is aimed at explaining the 
market structure effects of demand and supply shocks, such as sudden inventory build-
up due to a recession or the loss of a key supplier.  They showed that the possibility of 
shocks impacting large buyers’ procurement may lead them to safeguard their profits 
through vertical or biased relationships, rather than pursuing trade in a market setting. 
 
Moreover, the EMH has not effectively explained the fall in the number of suppliers that 
occurred in the auto industry in the 1990s (Cusumano and Takeishi, 1991). Bakos and 
Brynjolfsson (1993) proposed an interpretation if this phenomenon based on the theory 
of incomplete contracts, which posits that not all desired aspects of a trading relationship 
are contractible. Buyers may limit the number of suppliers to maintain supplier incentives 
to make non-contractible investments such as quality, responsiveness, and innovation. 




With the advent of e-commerce technologies and the Internet, we have observed the 
emergence of new markets and the proliferation of existing ones. Theoretically, this 
phenomenon can be partially explained with the EMH, which suggests that IT will reduce 
coordination costs across firms, leading to proportionally higher market-based forms of 
economic activity. On the other hand, quasi-market theories help explain why biased 
markets may prevail. When subject to transaction risks such as opportunism, asset-
specific sunk costs, and market uncertainties, Sellers can hold buyers hostage by 
                                                
3 Asset specificity refers to assets that are specific to the business relationship and that are not 
easily re-deployable. So investing in these assets becomes a sunk cost attributable to that 
relationship. 
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engaging in biased electronic markets and explicit relationships with a few suppliers. 
However, by reducing product complexity and asset specificity, IT decreases buyers’ 
vulnerability to these transaction risks, which reduces the viability of biased markets.  
 
This transaction cost-based rationale helps to explain how IT reduces buyer incentives 
to keep for explicit relationships with one or a few suppliers. However, it does not explain 
how or why IT may lead sellers to forego the advantages of locking in buyers through 
long-term agreements. Sellers have a structural incentive to bias markets and distort or 
conceal information in their favor. So there is a need to develop theory to understand 
how and why IT leads sellers to increasingly favor transparent electronic markets.   
 
We contribute to the unification and enhancement of prior theory by analyzing the air 
travel industry and the financial securities industry, which are representative of IT-
enabled market transformations in recent years. We leverage our analysis with market 
design theory, which offers a foundation to categorize the choices that sellers make that 
may affect market structure. In particular, this theoretical perspective examines different 
types of selling mechanisms and the conditions under which sellers will select one type 
over another. Before presenting our analysis of these industries, we provide a review of 
different market design choices and how they are influenced by IT advances. 
 
Possible Outcomes Of Market Structure 
 
In competitive markets an exogenous mechanism selects prices that establish 
equilibrium between supply and demand.  The related theory—market design theory or 
market microstructure theory—attempts to illuminate this “black box” by taking an 
alternative view (Madhavan, 2000). Market microstructure is defined as the set of market 
participants, institutions, and mechanisms that enable trade. It emphasizes that firms 
make explicit decisions to select trading prices and coordinate transactions that support 
exchange.  Spulber (1999, p. 7) states that “(f)irms create and operate markets: setting 
prices, carrying out transactions, producing and distributing information, and forming and 
monitoring contracts.” Equilibrium outcomes are aggregate results of the individual firms’ 
actions, including choices affecting market microstructure.  
 
The theory of market design focuses on the economic consequences of a trading 
mechanism’s design.  It has been extensively applied in the context of financial markets 
to understand how electronic trading influences liquidity, efficiency, and the distribution 
of wealth (Clemons and Weber, 1990; Schwartz, 1995), and there is a growing body of 
literature on the design of electronic markets, grounded on auction theory 
(Anandalingam et al., 2005). 
 
IT, Electronic Markets, and Market Design 
 
Firms use IT to design the informational features of their selling mechanisms and to 
automate them (See Table 1). The degree of automation of a trading mechanism is 
determined by transaction efficiency and its temporal and geographical characteristics 
(Schwartz, 1995). For example, Internet-based electronic markets enable efficient 
around-the-clock trading across national boundaries. In addition, automation allows 
sellers and buyers to trade without the intervention of intermediaries. Informational 
features of market design include market transparency, price discovery, and trading 
protocols. We now discuss in more depth how IT influences these informational features 
in the context of electronic trading. 
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Table 1. Market Design Dimensions and Impact of IT 
MARKET DESIGN 




Availability and accessibility 
of market information. 
Increases potential for complete, 
accurate, and unbiased market 
information 
Price Discovery Process by which market 
prices are established 
Enables innovative and dynamic 
mechanisms 
Trading Protocols Transaction process and 
rules  
Increases flexibility to set trading 
rules 
Degree of Automation 
Efficiency Speed and cost of 
transactions 
Increases efficiency 
Reach Frequency of transactions 
and geographical reach 
Increases reach potential 
Reliance on    
Intermediaries 
Degree of intermediation Enables electronic 
intermediation and direct trading 
Source: Adapted from Madhavan (2000) 
 
Market transparency specifies the extent to which information is made available to 
market participants, including pricing, product, and supplier information (Granados et al., 
2005). Market transparency is negatively affected by sellers’ decisions to bias, conceal, 
or distort information.  A biased market is defined as a market where product and price 
information from all sellers is not presented equitably. A market that displays only prices 
but lacks information about product characteristics is not fully transparent because 
information is incomplete. On the other hand, a market that distorts information is not 
fully transparent because the information is inaccurate. Incomplete or distorted 
information may be driven by a seller’s intentional market designs, or by technological 
imperatives that limit the quality and quantity of information that can be made available. 
We define opaque markets as those where information is incomplete or distorted. For 
example, Hotwire (www.hotwire.com) is an online travel agency that offers last-minute 
fares for multiple airlines, showing a low level of bias. However, it does not show the 
airline or itinerary until after purchase, so we characterize it as an opaque market 
mechanism.  
 
E-commerce technologies increase the potential for market transparency, and sellers 
strategically decide whether to capitalize on this potential in two ways.  First, they can 
make choices regarding the information to be disclosed to buyers through their market 
mechanism, such as their own Internet portal or an electronic exchange in which they 
have decision-making power.  Second, they can make strategic decisions to trade in a 
market based on its information disclosure rules. Large market participants often avoid 
trading in electronic markets that require broad identity disclosure because it provides 
signals about their cost structure (Zhu, 2004) or their motivation to trade (Clemons and 
Weber, 1990; Madhavan, 2000). 
 
But buyers generally prefer market transparency.  This is because they can better 
ascertain a product’s value and then select the best product and supplier at the best 
price. Market transparency benefits buyers in three ways.   First, search costs decrease 
as more information is made available at no additional cost. For example, through the 
Granados, Gupta, & Kauffman/Market Information and Transparency 
           Journal of the Association for Information Systems Vol. 7 No. 3, pp. 148-178/March 2006 155 
Internet, major online travel agents (OTAs) such as Orbitz, Travelocity, and Expedia now 
provide immediate and inexpensive access to tables with multiple combinations of air 
carriers, flight itineraries, and ticket prices.  By purchasing a ticket via these OTAs, 
consumers can evaluate multiple alternatives and act as their own travel agents.  See 
Figure 1.   
 
 
Figure 1. Contribution of Market Transparency to Buyer Surplus 
 
Second, the value of a purchase increases if the consumer discerns product 
characteristics of existing alternatives with higher precision, resulting in more accurate 
product valuation (Hasbrouck, 1995).  In financial markets, for example, Internet 
brokerage firms are able to provide instantaneous and detailed information about a 
stock, which enables a more accurate valuation by the investor.   
 
Third, information may become available that allows a consumer to transact at a lower 
price for a given product.  Stigler (1961) showed that a lower price may result if search 
costs are reduced such that a lower market price is discovered.  However, there are 
some situations in which buyers may prefer less market transparency. For example, in 
business-to-business markets, high-demand buyers may express concerns about 
sharing too much information about their demand forecasts, lest an electronically-linked 
supplier exploit that information and turn prices against them (Kauffman and Mohtadi, 
2005). 
 
Price discovery, the process by which market prices are established, is another 
important aspect of market design.  Price discovery involves the process by which latent 
demand and supply result in realized market prices and trade volumes (Madhavan, 
2000). In some markets, by obtaining details about the trading process, buyers and 
sellers are able to discover their reservation prices. For example, in financial markets, 
transaction history provides clues about demand and supply pressures, which influence 





Notes:  Buyer Surplus A = Buyer surplus without transparency 
 Buyer Surplus B = Buyer surplus with transparency  
                         CONTRIBUTION OF  
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Auction theory is related to price discovery in electronic market design (Anandalingam et 
al., 2005). Electronic market mechanisms, such as double auctions, have a dynamic 
price discovery process:  every bid by buyers, sellers, or intermediaries is a signal to 
determine transaction prices. Other market mechanisms, such as posted prices, are 
more static. ITs such as the Internet enable the creation of novel and dynamic 
mechanisms, increasing the potential for price discovery. In turn, sellers make choices 
regarding market designs along a continuum from static to dynamic market mechanisms. 
For example, Internet-based electronic auctions of airline tickets have enabled markets 
for distressed seat inventories close to flight departures (Klein and Loebbecke, 2003).  
 
Trading protocols represent the rules of trading and transactional exchange.  Protocols 
are often the result of ongoing business practices and transactional norms.  They may 
reflect government regulations to ensure fair trading practices, market participation fees, 
and other fixed transaction costs for the market participants. Advanced ITs enable 
innovative and flexible definition of transaction protocols. For example, the practice of 
24-hour electronic trading in financial markets is now possible thanks to Internet 
technologies. On the Internet, a change in trading rules may require a small, immediate, 
and inexpensive change in a Web site’s design that will become rapidly available to all 
participants. 
 
IT and Market Design Trade-offs  
 
Together, these informational features of market design influence market performance. 
However, there are trade-offs to be made, because changing a market’s design in one 
dimension may affect it in another (Levecq and Weber, 2002).  In the market 
transparency dimension, suppliers and intermediaries are commonly faced with the 
trade-off between the benefits of a more transparent market to attract buyers and the 
losses that may be incurred by releasing private information. Though market 
transparency increases demand by attracting buyers, it may put seller profit at risk due 
to better informed buyers (Porter, 2001).   
 
In the price discovery dimension, sellers face the decision to post fixed prices or 
negotiate.  While negotiation allows effective price discovery, there are information and 
negotiation costs that may deter buyers (Riley and Zeckhauser, 1983).  There is also a 
trade-off between selecting a fixed price versus an auction mechanism.  While an 
electronic auction may attract buyers through effective price discovery, it may also hurt 
seller revenues as buyers enjoy higher levels of price transparency.  Therefore, market 
design decisions that buyers, sellers, and intermediaries make depend on the evaluation 
of these trade-offs.   
 
We contend that IT transforms these market design trade-offs, such that the long-term 
expected aggregate outcome of sellers’ market design decisions will change. In the next 
section, we examine this process for air travel and financial securities, which have gone 
through significant IT-driven changes in the dimension of market transparency. Based on 
these mini-cases, we develop a theoretical framework of the impact of IT on market 
structure.  
 
Within-Case Analysis: Air Travel and Financial Securities 
 
The robustness of a theoretical model is largely based on its ability to explain different 
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kinds of outcomes that are observed for a given phenomenon. We seek to explain the 
extent to which transparent electronic market mechanisms prevail across industries. 
Some industries make it to that point sooner, while others arrive later (and possibly not 
at all). Since our goal is to develop an effective variance theory, we selected the air 
travel industry and the financial securities industries for our study, because they exhibit 
significant variation in the degree of bias, accuracy, and completeness of market 
information. We observe that since the advent of the Internet, these industries have 
made strong moves toward higher market transparency, but their sources and extent of 
this transformation differ. We summarize our extensive within-case analysis on these 
industries based on prior research experience, current press releases, academic 
journals, specialized industry publications, and interviews with industry experts.  
 
Case 1: Electronic Markets for Financial Securities 
 
Financial securities have been traded electronically for decades in markets such as the 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). Recently, Internet technology has created new 
opportunities for electronic transactions in both business-to-business (B2B) and business-
to-consumer (B2C) electronic markets.  In this mini-case, we examine the forces that, 
together with Internet technology, have resulted in new market mechanism designs for 
the trade of financial securities.  We focus on the differences that have emerged in the 
electronic trade of bonds and stocks. 
 
The Institutional Markets for Equities and Bonds   
 
The markets for fixed income securities in the United States have been the province of a 
group of powerful investment banks that have exercised considerable market power. The 
result for private corporations and public organizations that wish to issue bonds to obtain 
capital in the primary market, as well as for investment management firms and individuals 
that wish to trade bonds in the secondary market, is that they have not been able to 
benefit from some of the efficiencies that are normally associated with the equities 
market.  Equity markets vary in all design dimensions, namely market transparency, price 
discovery, and trading protocols (Levecq and Weber, 2002; Madhavan, 2000). In the 
market transparency dimension, designs vary in the time and extent of the information, 
and it is commonly intervened by regulations to ensure efficiency and fairness. For 
example, U.S. regulations require that transactions be reported within 90 seconds of the 
transaction, compared to 90 minutes on the London Stock Exchange. In the price 
discovery dimension, there are auction markets that are order-driven; they match buy and 
sell orders continuously. On the other hand, there are call markets that are quote-driven; 
they match prices based on bid and ask quotes from a market maker. Transaction 
protocols determine other conditions of trade such as the immediacy and the priority of 
order execution. 
 
The bond market, on the other hand, up until 1997, had only a few viable private 
electronic markets that permitted bond issuance and trading (e.g., Bloomberg, Morgan 
Stanley, First Boston Corporation, etc.) (Bond Market Association, 1997a). During the 
1990s, there were contentious public policy debates related to the “opaqueness” of the 
bond market (Bond Market Association, 1997b). Prices were difficult for investors to see 
because trade-related information was guarded by the market-making investment banks, 
who stalled the move to newer market designs that permit fuller market transparency.  
This practice was facilitated by the inherent diversity of bonds relative to equities. Firms 
with one or two issues of stock (common and preferred) may have numerous bond series, 
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reflecting different coupon rates and the maturity of the debt.  Therefore, there may be 
millions of fixed income securities compared to a few thousand shares (Allen et al., 2001). 
 
During the 1990s, the impact of new e-commerce technologies began to be felt, as 
trading and competition grew outside of the traditional trading floors (Economides, 
2001).  Prior to gaining authority as a primary issuer of bonds like investment banks, 
commercial bank J. P. Morgan innovated with a dial-in screened-based bond issuance 
market for “vanilla debt” involving the most well known corporate names. Although the 
system, Capitalink, did not succeed, it nevertheless sensitized the market to the 
possibilities that technology held for transforming market design in support of bond 
issuance.   Later, as the Internet grew, other investment banks, government agencies 
and entrepreneurs implemented technology-based approaches to trade various kinds of 
fixed income securities (Bond Market Association, 1998-2003).  A number of players put 
together different types of electronic markets, including auction systems, inter-dealer 
systems, multi-dealer systems, single-dealer systems, and cross-matching systems 
(Bond Market Association, 2003).  Examples are MarketAxess (www.marketaxess.com), 
for bond trading among institutional investors, and the Bloomberg Municipal System 
(www.bloomberg.com).  
 
Despite recent innovation in the design of market mechanisms for bond trading, 
electronic markets for bonds have not had the same lasting effect as those in equities 
markets. Because of the existence of single-dealer markets that use the Internet as a 
means to involve their own institutional investment clients, there is still bias in the bond 
market.  Some of these systems are reachable via the Internet, while others are only 
available through an intermediary, Bloomberg Inc., the preeminent quote vendor and 
financial news network (Bond Market Association, 2002).  They include Lehman 
Brothers (www.lehmanlive.com), Credit Suisse First Boston (www.csfb.com), Merrill 
Lynch (www.ml.com), Morgan Stanley (www.morganstanley.com), and J. P. Morgan 
(www.jpmorganexpress.com), among others, and reflect the fact that the prior “oligopoly 
players” are still using the new technologies to make markets for bonds based on client 
relationships, instead of a full-fledged market-based approach.    
 
However, there have been significant advances in market transparency and fairness in the 
trade of bonds thanks to Internet technology. Other research that we have under way 
analyzes the structure and performance of digital bond markets in the U.S., and notes the 
path-breaking range of their innovations.  The Internet has provided a basis for pushing 
the capabilities for bond exchange beyond what was historically observed, when bonds 
were largely traded in biased electronic markets.  In addition, it is clear that with this new 
technology has come a greater impetus for competition around new and enhanced market 
designs.  But the emergence of transparent electronic markets for bonds has been slowed 
down by their own nature.  Bonds are not as commodity-like as stocks.  So considerations 
necessary to an effective market process may still be affected by the inherent complexity 
of bonds, which may explain why only 10% of corporate bonds were electronically traded 
in 2000 (Allen et al., 2001). 
 
Bond and Equities Markets for Individual Investors 
 
In the 1990s, Internet-based trading mechanisms for individual investors also emerged, 
such as E*trade (www.etrade.com), Charles Schwab (www.schwab. com) and Ameritrade 
(www.ameritrade.com).  Internet brokers allow individual investors to trade stocks 
electronically with low transaction costs.  In addition, they provide timely market updates 
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and archives of research reports.  By providing Internet-delivered market information, 
automated trading, and low transaction costs for individual investors, these companies 
succeeded in an industry that had historically been controlled by large, powerful players.   
 
Despite the emergence of these discount brokers, the niche for full-service brokers 
remains. In the equities markets, there is still a need for brokers who provide value-added 
investment services to individual consumers.  In particular, given the overload of 
information for a given stock or group of stocks, it may be economically justified for 
investors to pay for information brokerage services that increase the level of market 
transparency even further, at a fee.  Hence, there remain opportunities for product 
differentiation and market segmentation, which make hierarchical forms and biased 
markets feasible.  For example, wealthy individuals often prefer to have one or two 
investment services firms manage their investments.  
 
The rise of B2C transparent electronic market mechanisms in the stock market presents 
similar trends as in the B2B sector.  On the other hand, bond trading remains in the hands 
of professional trading firms to a greater extent.  Web-based technologies for the trade of 
financial securities are still evolving, but the product complexity of bonds limits the 
development of transparent bond markets.  
 
Case 2: Markets for Corporate and Leisure Air Travel  
 
Online travel sales increasingly threaten the market-making position of traditional travel 
agencies. In 2003, about 40% of U.S. airline tickets were sold via the Internet (Airline 
Business and SITA, 2003).  An important driver of this trend is the increased level of 
market transparency facilitated by technologically-innovative and customer-friendly 
online travel agencies (OTAs) such as Orbitz (www.orbitz.com) and Expedia 
(www.expedia.com).  In the same year, approximately 20% of U.S. corporate travel 
revenue was managed online (Phocuswright, 2003).  These are both significant amounts 
relative to the overall cross-industry percent of retail sales through the Internet, which 
was short of 2% (U.S. Census Bureau, 2004). In this mini-case, we explore the 
accelerated IT-driven move to markets in the corporate and leisure air travel markets. 
 
B2B Air Travel Markets: Airlines and Travel Agencies 
 
Travel agencies take advantage of the high complexity of airline prices and product 
descriptions to act as information brokers by simplifying offers to corporate and leisure 
travelers (Clemons and Row, 1991). The information brokerage role performed by travel 
agencies was strengthened in the 1980s with the development of computer reservation 
systems (CRS) technology. The airlines developed this technology to compete 
effectively after deregulation of the industry in 1978.  CRS terminals were typically 
installed at travel agency locations based on long-term contractual sales agreements. 
Through these contracts, agencies were locked in to an airline or small set of airlines 
depending on the CRSs installed (Copeland and McKenney, 1998).  By 1983, 80% of 
tickets were sold by travel agencies through CRS terminals.  
 
Due to the biased nature of CRS contracts between airlines and travel agencies, 
allegations emerged suggesting that automation of airline ticket distribution had resulted 
in an anti-competitive market environment. In June 1983, the government concurred and 
intervened, ordering CRSs to provide data on their flights and ticket prices to 
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competitors, avoid discriminatory fees, and eliminate screen biases that favored the 
position of product offers for the airline owner or owners of a CRS.   
 
While the level of bias decreased in the market for airline tickets due to these new laws, 
travel agencies still had the ability to conceal and distort information (Levine, 1987). 
CRSs reduced product complexity for travel agencies, but travelers remained dependent 
on their relationship with the agencies to get the best travel offer at the best price. 
Moreover, globalization and extension of the functionality of these CRSs to include hotel 
and car reservations led to global distribution systems (GDSs), which allowed airlines 
and travel agencies to further consolidate their competitive positions by offering 
complete and timely information to the traveler for air transportation, ground transport, 
and lodging. 
 
B2B Air Travel Markets: Corporate Travel 
 
Corporate travel accounts for approximately 55% of total air travel passengers 
(PhocusWright, 2003).  Historically, brick-and-mortar travel agencies have added value 
for business travelers by searching for the best prices and services.  In addition, they 
aggregate demand for corporations to negotiate lower prices and value-added service 
with airlines (Clemons and Row, 1991), contributing to the segment of the industry 
known as managed business travel.   
 
Corporate travel customers typically have a need for special services. Frequently, their 
plans change and they need timely attention to change their travel itineraries. In addition, 
travel itineraries are sometimes complex, involving more than just a simple round trip 
between two cities. Therefore, the complexity of corporate travel needs is an opportunity 
for traditional travel agencies to provide service brokerage between airlines and 
corporations.   
 
Rosenbluth Travel is a case in point (Clemons and Row, 1991). Rosenbluth Travel 
developed an information system that consolidated travel offers from several major 
CRSs to provide value-added service to its corporate travel customers.  The company 
gained competitive advantage by improving efficiency for its customers, through a wider 
variety of product offers tailored to specific customer needs. In addition, the system 
provided complete and accurate information about prices and alternative itineraries, both 
current and historical. Soon competitors replicated this technological innovation, but at 
that point Rosenbluth travel had consolidated its position in the B2B travel agency 
services market worldwide.   
 
Despite technological advances that allow corporate travelers to perform transactions 
directly with airlines, travel agencies continue to perform an added-value role in the 
business segment of air travel. This may explain why transparent OTAs have 
successfully penetrated the leisure and unmanaged business travel markets (see 
below), but they are just beginning to make inroads in the managed business travel 
segment.  In 2003, 20% of U.S. corporate travel was sold online, compared to 40% for 
the industry as a total. Due to the service requirements of business travelers, there may 
be a limit to the value that can be extracted from Internet-based reservation-making 
(Chircu and Kauffman, 2001). Nevertheless, recently major OTAs have developed 
strategies to further penetrate the corporate travel business segment, and brick-and-
mortar travel agencies such as Carlson Wagonlit Travel are being forced to respond with 
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their own Internet-based market mechanisms that offer the lowest prices in the market 
(Reinan, 2004).   
 
B2C Air Travel Markets 
 
In the 1980s and 1990s, travelers typically built relationships with a preferred travel 
agency to book and purchase airline tickets. The development of the Internet enabled 
new B2C distribution channels in many industries, and the air travel industry was no 
exception. In the 1990s, multiple online travel agencies (OTAs) emerged to offer travel 
products to consumers over the Internet, threatening the information brokerage role of 
travel agencies.   
 
The design of market mechanisms in these OTAs varied (Klein and Loebbecke, 2003). 
Most OTAs offered travel options based on list prices; however, others attempted 
innovative price discovery mechanisms. For example, TravelBids introduced auctions 
from the consumer’s side, where consumers would post an itinerary and travel agencies 
would bid for the trip based on their inventory availability and prices.  Priceline.com 
introduced a name-your-own-price mechanism that resembles a sealed-bid auction, 
where consumers make a bid for a trip, and the airline and specific itinerary is revealed 
only after purchase. Some OTAs were designed to be transparent, such as Expedia 
(www.expedia.com), which displays itineraries and prices from multiple airlines based on 
a trip search request. Others were designed to be opaque in product, price, or supplier 
information, such as Priceline.com (www.priceline.com) and Hotwire (www.hotwire.com). 
Opaque OTAs compensate the consumer for this lack of market transparency with lower 
prices.   
 
In an attempt to increase revenues, some OTAs initially created biased selling 
mechanisms.  Similar to GDSs in their inception, OTAs such as Travelocity 
(www.travelocity.com) and Expedia (www.expedia.com) negotiated agreements with 
airlines to favor their itineraries in a screen display, resulting in biased offers to 
consumers. In addition, airlines reintermediated the online travel sector by developing 
their own Web sites to offer airline-specific itineraries. 
 
Recently, the airline industry made a bold move to reintermediate the online travel 
sector.  Five major airlines introduced Orbitz (www.orbitz.com) in 2001, claiming that it 
was the most transparent OTA.  Orbitz was designed with a state-of-the-art Web-based 
system to offer as many products as possible for a travel request. In addition, Orbitz 
developed preferred agreements with airlines and distributors that guaranteed their claim 
to give the lowest published fares anywhere (Salkever, 1999).  Soon other OTAs 
followed Orbitz’s competitive move for higher market transparency (Granados et al., 
2005). Expedia and Travelocity have retracted from their strategy to bias fare searches 
in favor of specific airlines, and Hotwire and Priceline.com added transparent 
mechanisms to their opaque product offers. Nevertheless, after only two years, Orbitz 




In this section we perform a cross-case analysis that compares and contrasts the degree 
to which B2C and B2B air travel and financial securities markets have become 
transparent, the influence of IT in this process, and its interaction with other relevant 
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forces. We first provide some preliminaries, including some assumptions for our 
analysis. Then, we present a theoretical framework that emerged from this analysis, and 
the related propositions. Finally, we discuss the findings and the implications for IT 
strategy. 
 
Preliminaries And Assumptions 
 
Advances in IT increase market design alternatives and add complexity to a firm’s 
evaluation of market design trade-offs.  In the Internet environment, while traditional 
players have created electronic market mechanisms to sell and purchase products, non-
traditional market-makers have also emerged with new and innovative market 
mechanisms. Examples covered in our mini-cases are Capitalink in financial markets, 
and Priceline.com in air travel, among others. The mini-case studies of the air travel and 
financial Internet markets suggest that market design options for market participants 
have multiplied, yet there is an increased preference for the use of transparent market 
mechanisms. In the following cross-case analysis, we will develop propositions to 
explain the preference for transparent electronic markets. To make our analysis tractable 
and to set the boundary conditions for the application of our findings, we make the 
following assumptions:  
 
• An industry is a closed economic system, so structural market outcomes are not 
influenced by developments in other industries.  
• The impact of IT on firms’ internal operations does not affect market structure. 
We will later relax this assumption and discuss the implications.  
• The benefits of transparent electronic markets are evident for buyers (i.e., buying 
firms or consumers).  
• Sellers (i.e., suppliers or intermediaries) have the ability to design and implement 
their own market mechanisms, or to strategically trade in existing electronic 
markets.  
• Sellers have incentives to maintain information advantages in the form of bias, 
distortion, or concealment of information.  
 
How then can the aggregate IT-enabled strategies of sellers result in the dominance of 
transparent markets?  What are the forces that drive or inhibit this process? Once 
economic organization is market-based, it can vary in several dimensions, including the 
degree of bias and opaqueness.  We argue that IT alone does not eliminate the 
incentives sellers have to implement biased or opaque markets. Despite IT advances, 
sellers still have the choices to introduce bias and opaqueness, or to compete for buyers 
with market information. Therefore, a move to transparent markets can be viewed as a 
process by which the market design trade-offs of most sellers evolve to favor and 




In the following analysis we show how markets with unbiased, complete, and accurate 
information tend to prevail despite the explosion of IT-driven market design options for 
sellers. Figure 2 shows our theoretical framework for the move to transparent electronic 
markets by contrasting and comparing the status of market structure in the financial 
securities and air travel industry sectors .  
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Notes: (1) Transparent e-markets are less dominant for bonds than stocks due to the higher 
product complexity of bonds. (2) Price competition in the travel industry has facilitated the 
move to transparent e-markets. However, differentiation strategies possible in corporate travel 
markets have inhibited this move.  Service-oriented corporate travel products make biased and 
opaque markets competitive, in part due to the non-digital nature of customer service. (3) 
Travel agency distribution became transparent due to regulatory measures that curbed anti-
competitive behavior. 
Figure 2. Structure of the Air Travel and Financial Securities Markets 
 
From Electronic Hierarchies to Electronic Markets (Link A) 
 
IT and forces that facilitate competition and electronic trade drive the move to 
transparent electronic markets with accurate, complete, and unbiased information. The 
EMH suggests that IT facilitates the move to market-based electronic trading by 
diminishing market coordination costs. Figure 3 shows how the theory of electronic 















Note: Link A represents the impact of IT on the shift from electronic hierarchies to electronic 
markets, or the EMH. Although Link A represents the core focus of the EMH, we emphasize 
that Malone et al. (1987) also discussed and made predictions about the subsequent stages of 
market structure in the dimension of bias, reflecting the roles of some of the other links in the 
figure. Link C shows the impact of IT on electronic product representation. Links B, D and E 
suggest that IT, electronic product representation, and competitive and institutional forces help 
together explain the variance in market transparency levels across industries. 
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IT-Driven Market Transparency (Link B)   
 
IT enables transparent market design choices that help sellers attract buyers.  
First-movers will benefit most from proprietary technological innovations, but competition 
is likely to follow.  We observe this phenomenon in both air travel and financial 
securities, where new technologies have enabled competition for customers with market 
information. Representative examples are Rosenbluth and Orbitz in air travel and 
Capitalink in the bond market. These firms took advantage of e-commerce technologies 
to increase their customer base by developing technologies to process and offer market 
information beyond common industry practices. This leads to our first proposition: 
 
• Proposition 1 (The IT and Market Information Proposition):  Sellers will 
deploy and develop IT to compete with market information. 
 
The IT and Market Information Proposition suggests that firms will use IT to innovate 
with transparent market mechanisms, beyond the traditional low cost and product 
differentiation strategies. We observe that in all industry sectors of air travel and financial 
securities markets, the move to transparent electronic markets started with innovations 
to compete with market information. As sellers automate their processes and take 
advantage of e-commerce technologies, they will increasingly compete for buyers by 
offering product and price information that informs their purchase decisions.  
 
This proposition expands and complements the transaction cost-based premises of 
electronic markets and hierarchies theory.  It suggests that a milestone necessary for a 
move to transparent electronic markets is the use of IT for revenue-generating 
strategies. However, this proposition falls short of suggesting that IT alone leads to the 
dominance of transparent markets. Incentives may remain for most sellers to maintain 
non-transparent selling mechanisms.  For example, quasi-market theories suggest that 
biased market mechanisms may prevail even in the presence of IT.  More generally, 
although IT enables new market designs, the trade-off between the informational 
advantage of biased and opaque mechanisms and the increased revenues from 
transparent mechanisms may still favor the former.  This may explain why some markets 
have remained biased despite the presence of advanced ITs.  We contend that, together 
with IT, other conditions and forces must be present in order for transparent market 
mechanisms to prevail.  
 
IT and Product Characteristics (Links C and D) 
 
We define electronic product representation as the ability to describe a product through 
an electronic medium. The air travel and financial securities markets suggest that ITs 
that reduce product complexity and that digitize product characteristics influence 
electronic product representation, which in turn has an impact on sellers’ market design 
choices. 
 
IT and Product Complexity. Bonds exhibit a high level of product complexity relative to 
other financial securities, which may explain why transparent bond market mechanisms 
have been slower to evolve than those in equity markets.  IT-driven pressure to adopt 
transparent market mechanisms is structurally weakened by the complexity of bonds, 
which makes biased and opaque bond markets still viable. Because bond trading is still 
mainly in the domain of professionals who make complex decisions over the many 
different risk profiles offered by fixed-income securities, individual investors still lack 
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automated brokerage services that provide bond investment recommendations.  This 
relative lack of IT-based automated mechanisms leads to the persistence of long-term 
relationships between individual investors and investment services firms for bond trading. 
 
More generally, we contend that the higher the level of product complexity, the less 
pressure IT exerts on suppliers and intermediaries to adopt transparent market 
mechanisms. This is because firms can provide value-added services to simplify product 
complexity for the buyer. This opportunity for service differentiation decreases the need to 
seek innovative market designs.  Buyers face uncertainty and opportunism risks that 
suppliers and intermediaries can mitigate by offering long-term business relationships, 
resulting in viable biased or opaque markets.   
 
However, by reducing product complexity, IT may in turn reduce the competitive viability 
of opaque and biased market mechanisms.  For example, motivated by the complexity of 
airline schedules and prices, airline owners of CRSs originally enjoyed economic 
benefits by controlling and selling airline schedule and price information through 
preferential agreements. Eventually though, travel agencies such as Rosenbluth 
developed technologies to aggregate, filter and simplify complex information displayed 
by CRSs, to the benefit of corporate travel customers (Clemons and Row, 1991; 
Granados et al., 2005).  In response, CRSs have become more open and service-
oriented.   
 
Digital Product Characteristics. Products can be classified based on the ability to 
represent them electronically. At one extreme are information goods, which are digital in 
nature and can be easily represented electronically. At the other extreme are physical 
goods such as clothes, which defy accurate electronic representation. We contend that 
along this continuum of product types, the more a product can be described digitally, the 
higher are the chances that transparent market mechanisms will prevail. Our rationale is 
two-fold, based on our observations of the air travel and financial markets.  
 
First, the relative success of OTAs was driven by the user-friendly and consistent display 
of product offers from multiple airlines, including the itinerary, number of stopovers, and 
prices. Since transparent market mechanisms offer product options from multiple 
suppliers, they require more processing, flexible tailoring, and manipulation to provide 
equitable, accurate, and complete information. Digital product representation reduces 
these costs of information processing, so the cost reduction benefits are relatively higher 
for transparent electronic markets.  
 
Second, both equity and leisure travel products are relatively easy to convey 
electronically, which allowed non-traditional firms such as E*trade and Expedia to 
develop Web sites with innovative market information displays. Upon their entrance, 
traditional firms were pressured to reintermediate the online market with their own 
transparent mechanisms. When products are easily represented electronically, it is more 
difficult for sellers to distort or conceal information, because there is competitive 
pressure from other players who can also provide this information at a low cost.   
 
It follows that IT artifacts that enable digital representations of a product favor a move to 
transparent markets. CRS technology in the air travel industry aggregated the complex 
information on airline schedules and service so that travel agencies could better 
translate this information to travelers. Later, this same technology was used by online 
travel agencies to develop user-friendly interfaces for travelers to make their own 
Granados, Gupta, & Kauffman/Market Information and Transparency 
Journal of the Association for Information Systems Vol. 7 No. 3, pp. 148-178/March 2006 166 
purchases. The Internet also allowed discount equity brokers to develop user-friendly 
representations of stock market information for individual investors. This leads to our 
second proposition: 
 
• Proposition 2 (The IT and Electronic Product Representation 
Proposition):  IT that enables effective electronic product representation 
favors a move to transparent electronic markets. 
 
Competitive and Institutional Forces (Link E) 
 
The air travel and finance industries provide evidence that competitive and institutional 
forces favor a move to transparent electronic markets.  
 
Competitive Forces. In U.S. air travel, it is common to observe price competition among 
airlines since the deregulation of the industry, particularly in leisure markets that have 
been commoditized. In the absence of the ability to compete effectively with 
differentiation strategies, competition by innovative and transparent OTAs has emerged 
successfully in the leisure segment. However, the competitive forces that favor 
transparent electronic mechanisms for leisure travel are mitigated in corporate travel due 
to its service-oriented nature. The market power that corporations obtain through 
consolidation of demand by travel agencies and the need for value-added services (e.g., 
handling complex trips and time-sensitive itinerary changes) reduce the pressure on 
corporate travel providers to compete with market information. Therefore, opportunities 
for product differentiation make biased and opaque market mechanisms viable in 
corporate travel.  
 
In competitive environments, firms have an incentive to adopt innovative market designs 
as strategies for differentiation. Facing the choice of implementing an IT-enabled 
transparent mechanism or competing on price to attract buyers, many firms will prefer to 
compete for buyers with market information.  Potential incremental benefits from a 
biased or opaque market mechanism will not offset the potential losses that price 
competition brings.  In addition, implementing transparent market mechanisms increases 
pressure to eliminate price discrimination.  For example, the Internet has allowed 
consolidation of international financial and air travel markets, diminishing the ability of 
firms to price-discriminate based on regional and national borders (Economides, 2001; 
Reuters, 2004). 
 
Institutional Forces. Institutional forces that promote a competitive environment also 
favor a move to transparent markets. Some institutions explicitly lobby to prohibit market 
bias and opaqueness, such as consumer protection agencies, industry lobbying groups, 
and regulators that prohibit predatory behavior by firms with market power.  In the 1980s 
the airline owners of GDSs gave preferential treatment to their own travel options in 
screen displays, so regulations were created to prohibit these practices of market bias.  
Moreover, regulations were introduced that required owners of GDSs to share sales 
information with other airlines, allowing competitors to have complete and accurate 
information about each other’s products, prices, and sales history. 
 
Institutional forces that discourage anti-competitive behavior indirectly lead sellers to 
collectively support transparent electronic markets. In particular, in the presence of 
regulations that make explicit collusion illegal, sellers may prefer transparent electronic 
markets so they can tacitly collude and avoid losses from price competition (Varian, 
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1999; Campbell et al., 2005). Such behavior has been observed in financial and air 
travel markets. Christie and Schultz (1995) found that traders tacitly colluded to avoid 
trading at the odd-eighth quotes, increasing the average spread. The study prompted an 
investigation by the Securities and Exchange Commission, resulting in a $1 billion dollar 
settlement with investors to drop pending lawsuits. Similar competitive and legal forces 
may also explain why, despite the risk to their profits, major U.S. airlines reintermediated 
the Internet B2C air travel market with Orbitz, which provided transparency to the market 
beyond what had been observed so far. The aforementioned analysis leads to the 
following proposition: 
 
• Proposition 3 (The Competitive Forces Proposition):  In the presence of 
price competition and laws that prohibit explicit collusion, sellers will favor and 
implement transparent electronic market mechanisms to collude tacitly.   
 
The Move to Transparent Electronic Markets  
 
So far, we have shown how IT favors transparent market mechanisms over biased and 
opaque ones in two ways. First, IT enables new and innovative ways to compete for 
buyers with market information, increasing the potential for market transparency (Link 
B). Second, IT increases the ability to disseminate market information electronically, by 
enabling digital representation of products and reducing the complexity of product 
descriptions (Link C). However, these impacts of IT do not eliminate all incentives sellers 
have to implement biased market mechanisms. Competitive and institutional forces 
further diminish the attractiveness of biased or opaque market mechanisms.  This leads 
to:   
 
• Proposition 4 (Transparent Electronic Market Proposition): In competitive 
industries where products can be effectively represented electronically, IT will 
lead to the dominance of transparent electronic markets. The absence of any 
of these factors inhibits the move to transparent electronic markets.   
 
Based on the conditions stated in the Transparent Electronic Market Proposition, the 
theory of transparent electronic markets predicts the industry sectors where the IT-driven 
dominance of transparent electronic markets will be observed. We contend that 
competition and product characteristics that favor electronic trading are sufficient to tilt 
the trade-off between the benefits of biased or opaque market mechanisms and 
transparent market mechanisms in favor of the latter. Other industries with any of the 
conditions absent may still experience a move to transparent markets, although at a 
slower pace or to a lesser extent than those where all conditions are present. 
    
Discussion 
 
In this section, we discuss the findings from the cross-case analysis and the implications 
for practitioners and researchers. 
 
In our effort to build a unified theoretical framework, we were originally motivated by an 
in-depth analysis of the air travel industry (Granados et al., 2005) to look at the existing 
theory more deeply, and to see what we could do to explain things that didn’t seem to 
match up with prior research. We were especially interested in the decision of U.S. 
airlines to invest in the development of technology to launch a transparent online travel 
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Web site, with unbiased, complete, and accurate information. As we expanded our 
analysis to include other industries, we obtained consistent observations of deliberate 
strategies by firms to compete with market information, despite the risks to their 
profitability.  
 
Our theoretical propositions—and our unified theoretical perspective, based on Malone 
et al. (1987) and other related literature—are the outcome of inductive and deductive 
thinking to explain how IT leads to transparent electronic markets, and our synthesis of 
the literature. Initially, we used existing theories of industrial organization and market 
design theory to evaluate the air travel industry and try to explain these paradoxical 
observations. A cross-case analysis of industry sectors within air travel led to a series of 
propositions. These propositions then were refined based on further literature review of 
related theory and a case study of financial securities.  
 
Table 2 summarizes the questions, theoretical propositions, and support from the cases 
we presented. To a certain extent, we found empirical support for the predictions of 
Malone et al. (1987) of IT-driven moves to unbiased markets. On the other hand, our 
framework is constructive in explaining why other forms of market organization may 
prevail, such as biased and opaque markets. We next discuss further how our 
theoretical development and synthesis overlap with existing theories, including the 
predictions of Malone et al. (1987), and where our unique contribution lies. 
 
The resulting propositions suggest that the move to transparent electronic markets is 
grounded on the use of IT in competitive strategy. All of our propositions argue that 
sellers will not only design market mechanisms to reduce transaction costs, but also to 
strategize and compete against their rivals. We contend that it is this competitive 
pressure that, under certain conditions, leads most firms to favor and implement 
transparent electronic markets.  
 
Nevertheless, the propositions carry forward some elements of transaction cost-based 
perspectives of industrial organization. For example, the reduction in information 
processing costs due to declining product complexity favors a move from biased and 
opaque markets to transparent markets, analogous to the existing rationale for the move 
from hierarchies to markets.  
 
Malone et al. (1987, p. 492) predicted that “(p)roducers who start out by providing an 
electronic hierarchy or a biased electronic market will eventually be driven by 
competitive or legal forces to remove or significantly reduce the bias.” To their credit, this 
is precisely what we observe in leisure air travel and equities markets in the dimension 
of bias. However, we have seen that these transformations are not only driven by pro-
competitive conditions and regulations. On a relative basis, the ability to represent a 
product electronically, either due to its information-intensive nature or due to emerging 
digital technologies that facilitate electronic representation, will moderate the pace or 
extent to which markets will become unbiased. Moreover, market transformations are 
not limited to the level of bias. The completeness and accuracy of information can also 
be affected by technological advances. Together, these factors may determine whether 
transparent markets prevail.  
 
Through our analysis, we have shown how these forces interact with IT to facilitate or 
inhibit the move to transparent electronic markets. In particular, based on the cross-case  
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Table 2. Theory Development and Empirical Support 
QUESTIONS THEORY DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT FROM CASES 
Why do sellers make 
market info available to 
buyers despite the risk of 
losing info advantages?   
How can sellers compete 
by offering market info? 
IT leads firms to compete in 
the dimension of market 
transparency (Link B, 
Prop.1). 
Innovative mechanism de-
signs in the Internet 
channel.  Some examples 
are Capita-link and 
E*Trade in financial 
markets, and Expedia, 
Price-line.com, and 




competition with market 
information (Link D).  
Bond markets are less 
transparent than equities. 
Corporate travel markets 
are less transparent than 
leisure markets. 
What industry-specific 
factors influence the 
extent to which sellers 
use market information to 
compete?  What role 
does IT play?  ITs that enable electronic 
product representation 
facilitate competition with 
market information (Link C, 
Prop. 2). 
CRS and Internet 
technolo-gies enabled 
transparent market 
mechanisms in air travel 
and financial markets. 
Competitive and institutional 
forces facilitate competition 
with market information 
(Link E).  
Equity and leisure travel 
are more transparent than 
other sectors within their 
respective industries. 
What environmental 
forces influence the 
extent to which sellers 
use market information to 
compete? What role does 
IT play? 
 
Price competition and anti-
trust laws lead sellers to 
tacitly collude through 
transparent electronic 
markets (Prop. 3). 
Tacit collusion in equity 
and air travel markets. 
Five major U.S. airlines 
launched Orbitz. 
IT and forces that facilitate 
competition and electronic 
trade influence the extent of 
a move to transparent 
markets. 
Bond markets and 
corporate travel markets 
are less transparent than 
sectors within their 
respective industries. 
Why does the availability 
of market information 
differ across industries?  
Why have unbiased 
electronic markets 
prevailed in some 
industries but not in 





In industries where IT and 
these forces are present, 
transparent electronic 
markets will prevail (Prop. 
4). 
There are fast-growing 
transparent electronic 
mechanisms in the equity 
markets and leisure air 
travel markets. 
Transparent B2B e-mkts 
dominate in travel agency 
ticket distribution. 
 
analysis, we found that the degree of price competition and anti-trust laws moderate the 
extent to which IT favors transparent electronic markets outcomes. 
 
Implications for Practitioners 
 
Identifying the Relevant IT Artifacts.  What are the IT artifacts in this research?  This is 
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 an important question for practitioners, whose firms’ technological capabilities, market 
situation, and strategic advantage are likely to be affected by the choices they make with 
respect to them.  What IT artifacts facilitate the implementation of transparent market 
mechanisms? In the contexts of our mini-cases, they are Web-based technologies in 
both financial services and air travel (e.g., Orbitz’s Web-based transaction systems and 
search engines, and the supporting database technologies), and global distribution 
systems (GDSs) and computerized reservation systems (CRSs) in air travel.  Also, other 
market exchange-related technological innovations speed information about market 
supply and demand to the marketplace, making it ever more competitive.   Some of 
these technologies today form the infrastructure for what Bergen et al. (2005) recognize 
as the new technological engine for implementing pricing and marketing strategy, and 
enhancing firm-level transaction-making capacity. 
 
Technology Breakthroughs and Transparency Outcomes. Despite their potential impact 
on transparency, technological breakthroughs have not necessarily led to increases in 
transparency (Garbade and Silber, 1976; Picot et al., 1995; Tapscott and Ticoll, 2003). 
Consider the U.S. financial markets after the invention of the telegraph in the mid-1800s. 
Although financial markets during that period in history were characterized by 
opaqueness and rampant fraud, the telegraph was the first technology to begin to create 
the basis for sharing market-relevant information over long distances, affecting efficiency 
and arbitrage opportunities between New York and London for foreign currency, and 
between New Orleans and New York for stock prices (Garbade and Silber, 1978). But it 
was only after the financial crash in 1929 in the United States that markets became more 
transparent.  This was due in large measure to intervention of the government through 
the Securities Act of 1933.  Major players in the industry were able to continue reaping 
the benefits of opaque financial markets for decades, despite the ideal that the telegraph 
would bring information equitably to all market players nationally—including small 
investors.  This continued well into the 1980s and 1990s, even with the “Black Monday” 
market crash of 1987 (Lucas and Schwartz, 1989).  We contend that in the Internet 
revolution most industries will experience a similar outcome. Sellers will continue to 
obtain benefits from market biases and opaqueness until they face competitive 
pressures and institutional forces that lead them to favor transparent electronic markets.  
 
Some sectors of the air travel and financial securities markets have experienced a faster 
move to higher levels of market transparency since the late 1990s. The Internet, as the 
conduit for improved information flows between sellers and buyers, has been a key 
contributor. However, other factors were also instrumental, such as the relative ease of 
product representation of leisure air travel and equities, and competitive and regulatory 
developments in these industries that pre-dated the Internet revolution. As these 
conditions appear in other industries, we expect to see a similar evolution toward more 
transparent markets. 
 
In a market environment where a move to transparent markets is expected to occur, first 
movers will have a preemptive competitive advantage. Therefore, we propose that 
practitioners should follow the development of technologies that facilitate product 
representation and competitive forces to assess whether a specific industry is likely to 
experience a move toward higher levels of market transparency. 
 
IT Strategy Implications for Implementing Transparency. Our analysis to this point has 
assumed that external forces dictate the organization of markets. Putting that 
assumption aside, we contend that, regardless of the impact of IT on the internal forces 
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of the firm, external forces will continue to dictate the long-term outcomes. As the cost of 
IT investments decreases and the processing capabilities of computers increase, IT will 
allow firms to process data and generate more timely, more accurate, and more 
complete information.  This will only accelerate the outcomes for market information 
predicted by our propositions.   
 
Unbiased markets require the development of integrated or compatible databases and 
interoperable systems that make product and price information from all sellers available 
to buyers (Malone et al., 1987). For complex products, the development of standards for 
product description, transaction formats, and data definitions is likely to facilitate higher 
structural levels of market transparency, and interfirm collaboration may be necessary 
(Wigand et al., 2005).  Technologies that facilitate conversion of product characteristics 
into digital formats will enable market transparency in industries of complex and non-
digital products. 
 
As firms consider the implementation of transparent electronic market mechanisms, IT 
managers can play a key role to enable them. Industries such as air travel and financial 
securities have benefited from existing legacy systems such as electronic exchanges 
and CRSs, which integrate information from most suppliers and make individual sellers’ 
systems interoperable. However, these systems typically have integrated architectures 
that make them very large and expensive. The Internet provides a powerful platform for 
IT strategists who are willing to break away from legacy system infrastructures to 
develop distributed, less expensive architectures that provide timely and accurate 
information without risking data integrity.  Orbitz, for example, uses a distributed 
architecture with networked, low-cost Intel servers to run web-based software that 




We have proposed a new unified theoretical framework for transparent electronic 
markets to explain and predict the role of IT on market structure transformations.  The 
approach that we have taken in this work is not the usual example of theoretical 
development that we most often see in the literature.  That often involves the use of 
multiple case studies as a means to identify the building blocks for new theory.   In this 
research, we have developed a theoretical framework that is based not only on case 
studies but also on the unification of numerous theoretical arguments and perspectives 
from the prior literature.  Our theoretical framework is innovative and potentially valuable 
for IT practitioners and researchers because it explains market structure in terms of the 
informational characteristics of a market. The core rationale of the framework is 
compelling. Sellers have economic incentives to adopt biased and opaque market 
mechanisms. While IT enables transparent market mechanisms, IT alone will not 
eliminate these incentives. Our analysis of the financial securities and air travel markets 
suggests that a combination of IT, competitive forces, institutional forces, and enhanced 
electronic product representation triggered the move to transparent electronic markets.  
  
We have taken advantage of the advanced stage of air travel and financial markets to 
develop a theoretical framework about the impact of IT on market structure. We applied 
an inductive approach appropriate in case study methodology (Eisenhardt, 1989) to 
examine the forces that play a role in the evolution of markets, toward high structural 
levels of market transparency. By analyzing multiple industry sectors within these 
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settings (i.e., B2B and B2C bond and equities markets, B2B travel agency and corporate 
travel markets, and B2C leisure travel markets), we found that new IT-enabled 
informational strategies are being used to compete for buyers, which is creating 
structural changes in the level of bias, accuracy, and completeness of market 
information. In addition, we found that there are common forces that drive these changes 
in market structure. 
 
Although the number of contexts that we have examined is not large, they nevertheless 
allowed the formulation of a set of propositions, in concert with the prior theoretical 
literature, which can be potentially applied to and tested in other industry settings. 
Additional in-depth case studies can be performed to validate and enhance these 
propositions. For example, an interesting case is that of the book market, where 
Amazon.com has led the path to greater levels of market transparency. Amazon.com 
has included secondary markets in customers’ search requests to reduce biases and 
enable price discovery, despite the risk to their profits. In addition, in 2003 it introduced a 
“Search Inside the Book” feature on its Web site that allows consumers to browse pages 
of more than 120,000 books, to effectively increase product transparency in the industry 
(Economist, 2004).  
 
With a larger dataset of industry cases, empirical analysis can be done to determine the 
impact of IT and other forces on market transparency. For example, cross-country 
studies by industry can be done to examine the impact of different degrees of 
competitiveness and legal forces on market structure. Similarly, cross-industry studies 
can be done to determine the impact of product characteristics on market transparency.  
 
Finally, we propose additional theory-building efforts to examine the impact of IT on 
other dimensions of market design. For example, although auction markets for used 
products have proliferated thanks to the Internet, they are not necessarily transparent. A 
buyer that engages in one auction commonly accepts the biased nature of this market 
mechanism, where other product offers are not considered. The success of Internet-
based auction markets for used products (e.g., www.ebay.com) suggests that the impact 
of IT on market structure should also be examined along other dimensions of market 
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